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1. Introduction: the Background of Local and Provincial Government 
South Africa inherited its formal state structure from Britain. Until the late 
1970s, subicentral government in any proper sense existed only for the White 
community. Since this was one of the few parts of the state structure that 
exhibited a ma'or deviation from the British flrnodelM, its distinct features require E brief mention. The main one was a provincial level of administration comprising 
three elements - an administrator, an executive committee, and a provincial council. 
The administrator was appointed and dismissed by central government. The executive 
committee was elected by the provincial council, and from 1970 provincial elections 
were held simultaneously with general elections, electing the same number of 
representatives for each province as that province had MPS. This provincial level 
of authority exercised fairly close control over the lower-level authorities, whose 
precise configuration and nomenclature varied from province to province and were 
regulated by provincial ordinances. 
The system of local government for Whites was, arguably, fairly 
authoritarian but it was recognizably local government. Tacked on to this system 
were other systems for the local level administration of Indians, Coloureds and 
Blacks. It is not necessary to review these here, other than to indicate the 
significant differences between the treatment of Indians/Coloureds, on the one hand, 
and Blacks, on the other. From 1971 to 1977 the affairs of urban Blacks were run 
virtually exclusively by Adm$nistration Boards under the aegis of the Department of 
Cooperation and Development. The official view was that Blacks were in "white" 
areas for purely economic reasons and could exercise no political rights outside the 
Homelands structures. Within the ideology of apartheid, neither Coloureds nor 
Indians belonged to Homelands and therefore segregated local government was conceded 
to them, at least in principle, as early as 1962. 
The changes that have taken place since the 1970s are twofold. There have 
been those in the central core of the local government structure which affect all 
the racial groups. Simultaneously, there has been a series of attempts to bring, 
first, Indians/Coloureds and then Blacks within this central core, in an effort to 
create a uniform but not universal system of local government: a structure, in 
other words, in which all racial groups would have roughly the same powers but would 
exercise them within their "ownff communities, this being the expression at local 
level of the distinction between llgeneral" affairs and I1ownl1 affairs built into the 
1983 constitution. 
In practice, the shift of ground on local government for Indians, 
Coloureds and Blacks has induced the necessity for considerable reconstruction of 
the local government system. As far as Indian and Coloured local government is 
concerned, the broad outline of the structures is clear though not the precise 
institutional detail. For these communities, local government is an I1ownt1 affair, 
dealt with by an appropriate minister in the Indian or Coloured Ministers Councils. 
The precise delimitation of new authorities will be carried out by the Municipal 
Development Board and the Demarcation Board, both working under the supervision of 
theDepartmentof Constitutional Development and Planning (henceforth CDP - the 
internal structure of this department has now changed but here I use what is now the 
familiar name). Because the Black population do not participate in the tricameral 
Parliament, their local government situation is rather different and its emergence 
has been more protracted. 
The government first conceded the possibility of urban local government 
for Blacks in 1977, in the form of Community Councils which were to operate under 
considerable ministerial supervision of their powers and activities. The 
Administration Boards remained in place and the minister was empowered to transfer 
Council powers to the appropriate Board. The failure of this measure led to 
considerable rethinking by the government, which culminated in the Black Local 
Authorities Act (102 of 1982) which conceded full local government powers to urban 
Blacks, the only major difference being its supervision by the Department of 
Cooperation and Development rather than the provincial authorities (and, in fact, a 
closer supervision). 
Complementary to this council legislation was the Black Communities 
Development Act (4 of 1984), which altered the position of the Administration Boards 
(relabelling them Development Boards), beginning a process in which they would lose 
their local government functions to town councils, where these existed, while they 
would play a "developmentH role, in practice envisaged as the establishment of 
Housing schemes and the training of local authority personnel. Even as this 
legislation was passed, it was evident that the Boards1 days were numbered as they 
were clearly hopelessly anomalous within the governmentfs emerging new design for 
local government. They were abolished in June 1986, their functions and personnel 
being transferred to proxincial administrations, central government departments and 
Black local authorities. 
These changes, culminating in the admission within a uniform system of 
local government of Indians, Coloureds and Blacks, have engendered major 
difficulties, given other aspects of South African economic and political life. In 
a narrowly administrative sense, the major problem of the incorporation process is a 
financial one. The two main effects of the apartheid system have been to ensure 
that, firstly, Indian, Coloured and, especially, Black areas do not have large 
commercial and industrial undertakings within their boundaries, and, secondly, they 
contain populations with low per capita incomes. Thus, generally speaking they do 
not provide an adequate revenue base for local authorities. 
This set of problems has attracted substantial attention from the 
government, and the outlines of its general response are now clear. More or less 
simultaneously it has tightened its control of the provincial level of government 
and set up a new kind of local authority institution to handle, in principle at 
least, the resource problem. The provincial legislatures have been abolished and 
replaced by new executive authorities appointed by the State President and headed by 
an administrator. The government has taken the opportunity of replacing an electe 
body by an appointed one, on to which it can co-opt Indians, Blacks and Coloureds. g 
These authorities have responsibility for the administration of "generaln affairs at 
provincial level but also for Black I'o~n'~ affairs, because there is no equivalent at 
national level of the Indian, Coloured and White chambers and Ministersf Councils 
which would otherwise fulfil this role. 
2. Regional Services Councils: Background and Rationale 
The second part of the government's response has been the Regional Services Council. 
The emergence of this institution was the result of a complex process which, at the 
moment, is only superficially understood. Although there has been a considerable 
amount of discussion of RSCs in South Africa, almost all of it has been either 
judgemental or recapitulatory. In the latter mode it restricts itself to a rather 
mechanical reworking of the statutory and other official formulations - it takes the 
state at its word, so to speak. This mode is, of course, buttressed by the division 
within South African academia between political science and public administration, 
the latter taught and researched almost exclusively at the Afrikaans universities 
and regarded there as essentially the handmaiden of administration. In the 
judgemental mode, one finds the deployment of some categories assumed to be virtuous 
(democracy or devolution or whatever) and one then examines the shortfall from the 
ideal. In this mode great attention is devoted to what RSCs are not, which does not 
tell us very much about what they are. In such circumstances, it is possible to 
outline with reasonable precision the formal progress of government thinking and 
suggest some analytical themes that need further work. 
The RSC idea can clearly be related to a long history of debate and 
proposals about the rationalization of services supplied by White local authorities 
by means of regionalization going back to the reports of the Borckenhagen committee, 
of 1964. However, in the absence of a serious study, the more recent developments 
can be followed through a series of official documents, beginning with the Browne 
Committee of Enquiry into the Finances of Local Authorities appointed by the 
Minister of Finance in 1976. Although it had been asked to look at the financial 
problems of White local authorities midway through its deliberations, it was asked 
to examine the finances of non-White authorities. Already convinced that bigger was 
better, it saw no reason not to extend that principle across the board. It took the 
view that, "In the development and establishment of separate local authorities for 
the non-white population groups, the advantages of the joint provision of services 
should be exploited as far as possible, and to this end Joint Services Committees 
should be established in which the core city or town retains a s p  commensurate with 
its financial responsibility in the provision of such servicesu. 
This committeels report formed the basis for a number of official studies 
and further considerations of the subject, perhaps the most important of which was 
the Croeser Working Group (later the Permanent Finance Liaison Committee) which 
accepted most of Brownels recommendations but baulked at the idea of mandatory 
transfer payment from rich White local authorities to poor non-White ones. The 
reason for this appears to have been resistance from White municipalities but this 
episode is not researched and the details remain obscure. In 1982 the President's 
Council Report on Local and Regional Management Systems appeared and reiterated the 
general thrust of government thinking. Finally, the government referred the whole 
matter to a committee of the Coordinating Council for Local Government Affairs (a 
body set up in 1984) under the chairmanship of Eugene Louw, the Cape Administrator. 
This committee recommended that RSCs be established, be charged with particular 
functions, be representative of local authorities, and have access to new sources of 
revenue. Most of these recommendations formed part of a bill tabled in May 1984 
providing for RSCs comprising White, Indian and Coloured local authorities. This 
bill was withdrawn and an amended bill providing for participation by Black local 
authorities was tabled in 1985 and became the Regional Services Councils Act (109 of 
1985 - there has subsequently been some amending legislation). 
The South African government, by its own standards at least, has made 
considerable efforts to present the process of legislation of RSCs as a consensual 
one. A major part of this claim has been the role of the Coordinating Council on 
Local Government Affairs, in which, it is said, the representatives of various 
interests have participated. Much of this is bogus, as the members of the Council 
and its committees are not there as representatives (except in a purely formal 
sense) but rather as members of a working group under the close supervision (some 
would say direction) of senior planners at CDP. 
However, that should not obscure the point that the RSC institution is the 
result of a complex set of political processes, of which, I would suggest, three are 
central. The first, and probably the most important, is relations between 
government departments. There are a number of aspects to this. One is the 
relations between the Department of Finance and CDP. The bureaucratic culture of 
Finance vis-a-vis local government is one of considerable suspicion (indeed, some 
senior municipal officials would say contempt). Finance's own preference was to 
abolish all existing authorities and reconstitute them on some more~ational basis, 
though the Department recognized this was politically not feasible. CDP has been 
much more concerned with building support for RSCs and, amongst some at least of its ' 
planners, pushing RSCs as part of a wider process of political reform. Again, with 
reference to the redistributional effects of RSCs, Finance has accepted this as 
desirable but has tended to support RSC levies as part of its own effort to reduce 
central government subsidy to lower level authorities, whereas CDP has seen the 
redistributional effects as essential to buttressing the legitimacy and effective 
functioning of Black local authorities. Finance persuaded the Cabinet to install in 
the legislation reserve powers for the department to curtail a'irresponsibleu 
behaviour by local authorities. 
Secondly, there have been complex struggles between the old Department of 
Cooperation and Development and CDP. The latter was constituted out of parts of the 
Prime Minister's Office, given a heavy-weight political head (Heunis) who assembled 
a team of reformers (many drawn from Afrikaans academia), though Heunis runs the 
department of a tight leash. CDP regarded Cooperation and Development as 
obstructive andreactionary (which it was). Part of the process of change involved 
CDP gaining control of all matters pertaining to sub-central government for Whites 
and all matters pertaining to urban Blacks (with the exception of education). As a 
result, obstructive parts of the bureaucracy were marginalized or abolished (e.g. 
the old Administration Board people were pensioned off or transferred to Provincial 
administrations or central government departments). It could be argued that this is 
part of a general process of restructuring the bureaucracy to make it more change- 
orientated (it is connected, for example, with the whole question of privatization 
and deregulation, a number of activities of the Commission for Administration which 
I cannot go into here, etc). But there are organizational and almost certainly 
party political constraints on this process, and particularly its pace. 
A second set of political processes, again with both wpoliticall' and 
"admini~trative'~ aspects, is relations between central and local government. White 
local authorities, grouped together as the United Municipal Executive, vigorously 
rejected the Browne Committee's ideas about automatic transfer payments and had seen 
the idea of joint service committees as relatively unformalized systems of co- 
operation. As the government's plans took shape and acquired a much more 
 political^' aspect, i.e. Black participation in government, White councils realized 
they would lose power and influence as participants in a process of reform which 
many of them, both on the right and the left, did not support. The government, in 
turn, as it became aware of the reluctance of many municipalities to go along with 
its proposals, included powers in the legislation that would enable it to force 
compliance on recalcitrant White councils. There is no question that Hewis leaned 
very hard on White municipal politicians and officials to be supportive publicly of 
the RSC idea. 
A third set of processes concerns relations between the central government 
and Blacks (here, obviously, my remarks are limited to that segment of Black opinion 
that is prepared to co-operate with the institutional reforms). The Black local 
authorities that came into existence under the 1982 legislation were resentful of 
the continuing role of the Administration Boards (and their supervising department), 
even in their ndevelopmentaltl guise, and it is reasonable to assume that most Board 
personnel were quite incapable of making the transition from punitive control 
functions and attitudes to supportive developmental functions and attitudes. The 
attempt to win over 'tmoderatelf Black opinion was two-pronged. Firstly, the formal 
announcement by the State President in January 1985 that Blacks would be represented 
on flgeneralt' affairs structures, starting with local government. This gave the 
green light to bringing Black local authorities on to RSCs (and related advisory 
structures). Secondly, there were promises (public and private) to Black 
councillors that the RSCs would go a long way to solving their financial problems. 8 
Again, the understanding of most observers is that Heunis's role in these 
negotiations was crucial. 
The cumulative effect of these various political processes is that the 
RSCs have acquired a number of legitimating rationales to which the government has 
stuck steadfastly in its official pronouncements, despite a certain degree of 
implausibility. RSCs are supposed to achieve cost-effectiveness in the delivery of 
council services, redistributional effects from richer to poorer (though this is 
invariably presented in the politically least painful way as the up-grading of 
infrastructure in the Black areas), and, finally, participation in "general" affairs 
structures - the latter usually articulated in a "bottom-up" terminology somewhat 
reminiscent of pre-Independencecolonial discourse (though there is a more 
sophisticated variant relying on concepts of devolution and free markets). The 
structure of RSCs exhibit the effects of these political processes and it is to this 
I now turn. 
3. Regional Services Councils - Structure and Functions 
Like all local authority bodies, RSCs have an area of jurisdiction, a set of tasks, 
an organizational structure and sources of revenue. I will describe, first, the 
formal regulations and then illustrate some of the political processes involved, 
using the Eastern Cape as an example. The central role in the demarcation of RSC 
areas and the setting up of RSCs is played by the Administrtors of the four 
provinces. The Administrators1 powers are extensive and subject only to the 
concurrence of certain government ministers and to the requirement to consider the 
report of a duly appointed Demarcation Board which holds open public hearings. It 
is also required to consult with all the local public bodies to be affected. The 
possible functions of an RSC are laid down in a schedule to the Act (see Appendix 
3). The statute tends to be permissive - RSCs may be charged with certain 
functions, or only a partof a particular function, and RSC functions may be executed 
on an agency basis by existing authorities. There is a general requirement, "that 
in determining the priorities in connection with the appropriation of funds, the 
council shall give preference to the establishment, improvement and maintenance of 
infrastructural services and infrastructural facilities in areas where the greatest 
needs therefore existw (Section 12/6). 
The Act provides that an RSC shall consist of a Chairman, appointed by the 
Administrator and representatives of all local authorities, management committees 
and other representative bodies within the region concerned. Members of an RSC are 
accountable to the local authority they represent. Individual local institutions 
are restricted to a maximum of five members on an RSC. Voting power is apportioned 
proportionally to the amounts paid for services used, excluding the use of services 
in an industrial area or central business district (the delimitation of the latter 
is also carried out by the Demarcation Board and the Administrator). No local body 
is entitled to a number of votes which is in excess of 50% of the total number of 
votes. All RSC decisions require at least 66% of the votes of those present at the 
meeting. Any local body within an RSC area may appeal against a decision of the RSC 
to an Appeal Board consisting of the Administrator, the three Local Government 
Ministers, and the minister in charge of Black local government. Finally, RSCs have 
three sources of revenue: money from services sold to users (local authorities); 
revenue from a levy based on total remuneration paid by employers, including the 
public sector (the rate is currently set at 0.25%); revenue from a regional 
establishment levy, based on the turnover of enterprises (currently set at 0.1%). 
The Act abolished a number of other levies previously imposed on employers. Overall 
control of the levies is vested in the Minister of Finance. 
Although RSCs are to be set up in all four provinces (though it is not 
clear whether the whole country is to be covered), there are different complications 
in different provinces. A major one in the Cape is the position of Divisional 
Councils. These institutions had levied a rate and had roughtly the same powers as 
a municipality but only exercised these powers in the rural portion of the 
divisional area. Traditionally, their most distinctive feature was the construction 
and maintenance of public roads, for which they received a government subsidy, but 
they also administered other services in the rural areas. Broadly speaking, as far 
as the demarcation process is concerned, metropolitan areas favoured smaller RSCs, 
and the government, for reasons which are not entirely clear, favoured much larger 
ones. Heunis has not hesitated to override not only the recommendations of the 
Demarcation Board but also the decisions of the Administrtor, in his determination 
to see large RSCs come into being (as in the case of Greater Cape Town). It is 
reasonable to suggest that, as well as party political factors, there are 
administrative factors in play. There has been an unprecedented period of upheaval 
in the public service in recent years which has left many officials disorientated, 
and even angry. There is a limit to how far the South African government can go in 
jeopardizing the morale of the public service, given the state's low political 
legitimacy. In interview, CDP planners admit that their brief had been to design 
the RSC structutre so as to minimize the destabilization of the existing local 
government system, and that, especially in the Cape, the Divisional Councils were a 
major vested interest. 
Strange as it may seem, the period 1984-87 was one of incredible confusion 
about RSCs at the municipal level. The Divisional Council (DC) bureaucracy clearly 
felt threatened (as one Eastern Cape Town Clerk put, "they were fighting for their 
lives"). Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Despatch municipalities submitted a joint 
memorandum to the Demarcation Board proposing an RSC based on the already existing 
Greater Algoa Bay Planning Authority region. The Dias DC, on the other hand, 
proposed a much larger area, comprising the whole of Dias, Humansdorp and Winterhoek 
DCs, a proposal which had the support of the local government directorate of the 
provincial administration. Certain officials from the DC engaged in a campaign of 
lfpersuadingnl smaller local bodies in the Dias area, particularly Black councils and 
management committees, to support their proposal. They also successfully 
manipulated the fears of farming communities that they would be disfranchised and 
lose services they had come to rely on (these fears were not entirely without 
foundation, as CDP planners seem to have realized that there were problems about 
White rural representation only very late in the day). 
But, at the level of local politics, there were other factors involved. 
Grahamstown, for example, has long had pretensions to being a regional centre, and 
sought to mobilize the smaller municipalities in the South Eastern Areas Development 
Association on the basis that their interests would be neglected in an RSC dominated 
by PE/Uitenhage/Despatch. A number of towns to the north of Grahamstown preferred 
the Grahamstown proposal, perhaps on ethnic/cultural grounds. 
Despite the recommendations of the Demarcation Board, th'e Cape 
Administration chose a much larger area, comprising the whole of Dias and parts of 
Humansdorp and Winterhoek DCs. On balance, it seems that Heunis1s department, 
desperate to get RSCs off the ground, was inclined not to antagonize DC personnel 
and to use DCs, in a sense, to construct ready-made RSCs. So, despite the 
government's commitment to containing bureaucratic tendencies, the Greater Algoa RSC 
came into existence with some 1400 employees. At the end of 1987 relations between 
this structure and the PE municipality remained utterly confused. Senior municipal 
officials were convinced that such a large organization would want to be seen to be 
"doing things", and, since central government is determined to see them work, it 
would be better to transfer functions in a rational way. Their view remained, 
however, that this would involve serious organizational problems and potential 
conflicts. 
It is the functions that provide the basis for the political weighting 
inside the RSCs; that is to say a local body has the same proportion of the vote as 
it contributes to the total revenue of the RSC for all the services the latter 
supplies. For the purposes of these allocations, consumption of services in Central 
Business Districts and industrial areas is not included. As the figures show, PE 
dominates the Greater Algoa RSC to an unusual degree, having nearly half the votes 
(by contrast, Cape Town has about 30% within the Greater Cape Town RSC). The only 
other significant proportions are Ibayi (Black City Council) and the PE Coloured 
Management Committee. My guess is that in these circumstances, where a considerable 
number of the forty councillors either have little local government experience or 
come from small White municipalities and the general situation is so confusing, the 
Algoa RSC will be dominated by its Chairman. All the RSC Chairmen have been 
selected with some care (and the appointments generally welcomed by informed White 
opinion that accepts RSCs). They are solid National Party members but all have 
considerable experience in regional and local government, and all of them have very 
clear ideas about what they want to do and do not envisage much interference from 
the central government (interviews). 
Local government itself is, of course, subject to definitional dispute. For a 
useful discussion of some of these aspects in the South African context, see 
S Bekker, *!Plaaslike Bestuur in Suid Afrika" (inaugural lecture delivered at 
UNISA, 1987), and S Bekker, "Devolution and the State's Programme of Reform at 
Local Level" (paper presented to Development Law Strategies Workshop at UNISA, 
April 1987). I am grateful to Professor Bekker for copies of these papers. 
Given the dearth of serious literature about South African politics, the best 
review of sub-central government I know of (though it is not intended as such) is 
L Kritzinger van Niekerk and R F Boths, "An Optimal Set of Fiscal Principles 
Underpinning Local Government in a Decentralised South Africa - an historical and 
theoretical perspective". I am grateful to Mrs Kritzinger van Niekerk for a copy 
of this research. A little tedious but also useful is A van Rooyen, "History of 
Local Government in South Africau (paper presented to ISER workshop "Does Local 
Government really matter?" (Rhodes University, 1987). 
See S Bekker and R Humphries, From Control to Confusion: the changing role of 
administration boards in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 
1985) 
For a birdvs eye view of the formal structure, see Appendix 1. For the insertion 
of the old Board functions into the provincial administration, see Appendix 2, 
which illustrates the situation in the Transvaal. 
For the details of the appointments to the new bodies, see South African Digest, 
15 August 1986. 
Browne Committee, p 64. 
Interviews with Gerhard Croeser , Deputy Director-General , Department of Finance, 
in charge of Public Finance. 
For work on Black local councillors, see R Humphries, "Recent Trends in Black 
Local Government PoliticsI1 (paper presented Rhodes University, September 1985), 
and D Atkinson, "The Search for Power and Legitimacy in Black Urban Areas: the 
role of the Urban Councils Association of South AfricaH (Rhodes University, ISER 
Working Papers, No 20, 1984). 
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